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ABSTRACT: 
Protection of domestic industry by means of restricting imports 
has been widely employed as a means of promoting industrialisation. 
Experience among less developed countries has shown that, while 
this often produces a short 1 exuberant" period of rapid industrial 
growth, it is likely to lead eventually to chronic balance of payments 
difficulties and other constraints on growth that inhibit sustained 
progress in industrialisation. This is partly because of the biases 
in the system of protection that inevitably govern when it originates 
as a response to a balance of -navments problem. Even deliberately 
planned protection for industrialisation, however, is likely to fail 
if it takes the form of import restriction. The traditional arguments 
for such protection (infant industry, et. al.) have virtuallv no 
economic merit - not that the market failures they identify are not 
real enough, but because the remedy is inappropriate and costly. 
A more rational protection system would avoid the biases of traditional 
protection against exports, against backward linkage, against employment, 
and against the processing of domestic raw products. At the same 
time it would correct the market failures that inhibit successful 
industrialisation in less developed countries. The most important 
of these market failures stem from factor price disequilibrium, 
infant industry cases, terms of trade effects and the interdependence 
of investment decisions. Such a more rational system could be based 
on a combination of a uniform tariff, a domestic value added tax 
system, and direct subsidies. It would be not only self-financing, 
but also far easier to administer than any existing set of industrilisation 
policies. 
THE ROLE OF PROTECTION IN INDUSTRIALISATION POLICY 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA* 
JOHN H. POWER 
. INTRODUCTION 
It is assumed without argument in what follows that industrialisation 
(loosely defined) is an essential aspect of economic development for Kenya, 
as well as for virtually all other less-developed countries. Perhaps 
all that is needed in this connection is a reminder that,so far as we 
have evidence, it appears that every case of successful economic development 
has been characterised by a very substantial rise in the proportion of 
output and employment attributed to non-agricultural activities; and that, 
during a prolonged critical phase of this development, it has been manufactur-
ing and the construction, transport, trade and service activities related 
to manuiacturing, that have grown most rapidly. For the world as a whole 
this direction of strucutral transformation is dictated by the changing 
pattern of consumption Lhat accompanies rising per capita income. For 
any particular country, however, it is also the changing composition of 
resource endowment that influences structural change in this direction. 
For Kenya, in particular, with its catastrophic rate of population growth 
and the reasonable expectation that it will take many years to bring it 
down to a viable level, it is critically important that the sectors where 
resources 
the principal/complementary to labour are most easily augmentable should 
begin to absorb a rapidly rising proportion of the new entrants to the 
labour force. This is not to deny that fur many years the weight of 
agriculture in an absolute sense will predominate in respect to both 
output and emplojonent. 
Because of the strong interdependence between industrial growth and 
growth in other sectors, industrialisation policy in the broadest sense 
might be virtually indistinguishable from development policy. Even in 
* I am grateful for stimulating criticism and comment to Peter Hopcraft, 
Stephen Lewis, Kurt Savosnick, Hans Singer, Michael Stewart and 
Bernard Wasow
- 2 -
a narrower sense,industrialisation policy would have to include policies 
for developing and improving entrepreneurship, for education and training, 
for the provision of essential services and infrastructure facilities, 
etc., in addition to all of the taxes, subsidies, restrictions and 
regulations that might come under the heading of "protection". So the 
latter is only one of many aspects of industrialisation policy. 
Nevertheless, its influence is pervasive because it affects the whole 
economic environment within which the other policies operate - the whole 
set of market price and profit incentives. For socialist, mixed, 
and private enterprise economies alike, experience has taught that 
efficient economic planning requires a system of prices that is not too 
far out of line with values implicit in social priorities and resource 
constraints. 
The discussion of the role of protection in industrialisation policy, 
which follows, is divided into three parts: first an assessment of the 
role that protection has played in the recent experience of less-developed 
countries; second, a critique of the traditional arguments for protection; 
and, third, an outline of a rational protection system for industrial 
growth that might better fit Kenya's development plans and aspirations 
than the existing constellation of policies. 
It might be useful, however, to introduce the discussion by tracing 
very briefly the intellectual roots of the thinking that lies behind it -
what Hollis Chenery has called the "new orthodoxy'1 in trade and industrialisa-
tion policies for less-developed countries. The new orthodoxy can be 
described briefly as outward-looking industrialisation. It contrasts 
with an old orthodoxy which was inward-looking industrialisation, as 
well as with an old-old orthodoxy which was outward-looking non-industrialisa-
tion. 
The old-old orthodoxy assumed a natural comparative advantage for 
less-developed countries in primary production. Hence primary exports 
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were considered, to be the engine of growth. The old orthodoxy in contrast, 
established a case for industrialisation on terms of trade and dynamic 
development criteria. But when it came to policies, the emphasis was 
on industrialisation for the'home market only, balanced in relation to 
home demand, with all of the limitations that implies. It was, in other 
words, what we might call a "half-way" industrialisation strategy. It is 
not just that the world market for manufacturers was neglected. The 
system of half-way protection actually penalised home "industries in the 
world market by keeping the price of foreign exchange below what it would 
have been in the absence of protection of the home market. Accordingly, 
an industry that might have sold in either home or world markets found 
that it was protected in the former but' penalised in the latter'. This was 
the kind of "protection'1 endorsed by the old orthodoxy. 
That policies of this sort would result in stunted and. frustrated 
industrial growth might have been predicted by economists. My impression 
is that by and large it was not. Instead, criticism of this inward-looking 
industrialisation strategy" appeared to come mainly from the old-old orthodoxy, 
the stress being on the harm to agriculture and other primary activities 
from an undue' emphasis on industrialisation per se, rather than on its 
inadequacies for industrial' growth. The new orthodoxy did not develop, 
it seems, until there had accumulated a great amount of evidence of 
frustration and disappointment with inward-looking industrialisation. 
The sequence of events' - again, an impressionistic view - appears to 
have been something like the following. First there was a growing 
recognition of the failures of the- old orthodoxy. Three important 
developments stemmed from that. There was the TJNCTAD approach of 
trade preferences, in the ri-cW countries' markets for exports of 
manufactures from the poor countries.1 In addition, there was renewed 
1. Raul Prebisch, Towards a New Policy for Developing Countries, 
(New York: United Nations, 196k). 
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interest in preferential trading systems among less-developed countries.' 
Finally there was also renewed interest in the reform of trade and 
protection policies within individual countries. 
In the meantime there was a growing accumulation of emp^ .cal studies 
and analyses of the failures of inward-looking industrialisation, generally 
2 
on a country by country basis. With this came also a growing disenchantment 
with the economic growth theory that was' the handmaiden of the protectionist 
policies - the theory that creating artifical profits for the industrial 
sector at the expense of the rest of the economy would lead, to a self-
sustaining saving and investment propelled growth. Saving was to be 
forced by the terms of trade squeeze on unprotected sectors, while investment 
were made to 
incentives/depend on interdependence through complementarities in 
consumption - the"balanced growth" doctrine. (I hasten to add that 
Lewis, Nurkse, and others should not be blamed for the popular versions 
of their theories that were only caricatures of the originals.) 
New growth strategies emerged, based more on supply linkages than 
on demand linkages. Economies of scale and the interdependence of investment 
decisionb through input-output relations called for the concentration of 
resources in selected industrial complexes, rather than their dispersion 
across the whole front of finishing-stages consumption goods production. 
This was incompatible with old-fashioned protection, but highly congenial 
to a new outward-looking view in which industrial exports were considered 
important along with efficient import substitution. 
2. See, for example, the comparative study, Industry and Trade in Some 
Developing Countries, co-authored by I. Little, T. Scitovsky, and 
M. Scott; also the various separate country studies; Brazil, by 
J. Bergsman, Mexico, by J, Bhagwati and P. Desai, Pakistan, bv S. Lewis, 
Taiwan and the Philippines, bv M. Esing, J. Power, and (r. Si cat; 
all published by ,Oxford University Pr-ss, 1970-71, for the Development 
Centre of the Organization for Economic cooperation and Development. 
Then; in the middle 19.60' s came the new theories of protection, 
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again based on input-output relations.. These led to the quantitative 
study of protection systems with the result that, for the first time, 
•policy makers .could view the overall - usually .shocking - results of the 
hodge-podge of protectionist policies that had been built un in unsystem-k . . 
matic fashion on ad hoc criteria. Viewing, these results, it was 
impossible- for anyone to savr "we planned it that way". 
The next- step .is, of course, to apply the lessons of the new 
evidence and the new theories to seek new means of accomplishing the 
promotion of sustained industrial growth in less-developed countries. 
Kenya and. other- African countries, being at an earlier stage both in 
industrial development and in the development of protection systems, 
have the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of others, rather than 
simply repeating them. It was with this purpose in mind that the present 
paper was written. .1 should emphasise that what .follows depends, more on 
a study of the experiences of other countries than on a study of Kenya. 
As empirical work proceeds on. Kenya's industrialisation and trade these 
ideas will become increasingly Ken^anised. My excuse for presenting them 
now is simply the hope that this will stimulate more, interest in, and 
critical discussion of, the role of protection in Kenya's development 
policies. 
PROTECTION IN PRACTICE ., 
While protection has been widely employed by less .developed countries 
seeking to industrialise, the results have been at best mixed, and. in many 
cases disappointing. Typically the sequence has been a balance of payments 
crisis met by import or foreign exchange controls, followed by a burst 
3. For the best summary, see W.M. Cordon, The Theory of Protection (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971). 
k. See, for example, B. Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection 
in Developing Countries (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). 
For an excellent discussion of methods and problems, see Lewis and G-uisinger, 
"Measuring Protection in a Developing Countrv: The Case of Pakistan", 
Journal of Political Economy, 1968. 
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of industrial growth in consumption goods industries substituting for 
the now more scarce or expensive imports.^ The new industries inevitably 
begin at the finishing stages of production, depending on imports for 
their raw and intermediate product needs, as well as for their capital 
equipment. Accordingly a system of priorities is established in the 
import control system, with consumers' goods strictly limited while 
producers' goods are more liberally imported. In addition, the less 
essential is deemed the consumers' good the more severely its import is 
limited (whether by tariff, quota, or exchange control). 
Such a system of priorities seems eminently sensible in terms of 
rationing of scarce foreign exchange and this no doubt explains its 
wide appeal. Adopted as a very short-run emergency measure it is easily 
defended since its protective effect would be minimal. Adopted as an 
industrialisation policy - or allowed to become one through prolonged 
reliance on import controls - these priorities are perverse. To restrict 
more severely the import of less essential goods means simply to give 
greater encouragement to their domestic production. Moreover, other 
things equal, effective rates of protection will be greater for those 
industries with the least value added in world prices - i.e., those that 
save the least foreign exchange. Finally, in administering a tariff 
5. Albert Hirschman identifies four origins of import substituting 
industrialisation - wars, growth of the domestic market following export 
expansion, balance of payments difficulties, and deliberate development 
policy. See his "The Political. Economy of Inroort-g^vg-kituting 
Industrialisation in Latin America", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
February 19^8, p. 5- The first two are outside of the scope of 
this paper. The third, which I believe to be typical, is the one 
on which this section is focussed. The last is considered in the 
next section. 
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or import control system, there is a strong tendency to give particular 
industries .just the protection they need - tariff commissions and other 
administrative bodies being ever on the alert to avoid giving any 
industry more. This means, of course, that the more relatively 
efficient an industry is, or becomes, the less protection it is likely to 
get - and vice versa. The upshot is that such a policy of protection 
systematically favours industries that are less efficient, less essential, 
and less effective in saving foreign exchange - all in the name of 
stimulating industrialisation and protecting the balance of payments. 
Moreover, there becomes established the familiar pattern of so-called 
"escalating rates of protection" - highest for consumption goods 
(especially high on the least essential ones), lover for intermediate 
goods, lower still for raw materials and. capital goods, and of course, 
lowest for exports. The resulting pattern of effective rates often 
shows'many consumption goods tifRfOiPmore than 100 per cent protection, 
while exports, capital goods and raw materials have negative rates. 
Nevertheless, such policies often provide a powerful short-run-
stimulus to industrial growth, even though such growth may be considerably 
overstated by a system of domestic prices far out of line with world values. 
What Albert Hirschman has called the "exuberant phase" of import-
substituting industrialisation stemming from the protectionist response to 
6 • 
balance of payments difficulties may last for as long as a decade. The 
reason is, of course, that import restriction plus liberal imports of 
"necessary" inputs creates an artificially profitable market for 
investment in consumers' goods production for the domestic market 
regardless of comparative advantage. An expansion of finishing stages 
production of consumers' goods, balanced in relation to home demand, could 
conceivably continue until import substitution has largely absorbed 
6. Op. cit. , p. 11 
the domestic market. 
It is just this, however, that tends to limit the length of the 
exuberant phase. For when the "boundaries of the domestic market for 
consumers' goods are approached the pace of industrial growth iust falter 
unless industrial investment moves to the level of intermediate goods 
and capital goods (backward linkage import, substitution), or manufactured 
goods move rapidly into the export market, or both. Yet it is just these 
potential areas of growth that are penalised by the typical protection 
system. 
Moreover, it is not.at all easy to.switch policy gears at this 
point - to reverse the system of incentives to make backward linkage 
import substitution and exports relatively profitable. For a reform of 
the structure of. protection,plus a devaluation would create considerable 
distress among a great number of the consumers' goods industries whose 
profits have depended on the biases of the protection system. These, of 
course, should never have been encouraged. A more rational policy from 
the start would have produced a more select list of consumers' goods 
industries, some already integrated backward, and some already exporting. 
The., lesson is that it is undesirable to have a sequential pattern of 
development requiring a different set of policies for each stage, with 
all of the political and economic difficulties that implies. What is 
needed, instead, is a relatively stable set of policies within which 
rational choices with respect to import substitution and exports at all 
levels of the production process can be. made from the outset, so that 
the decisions made, in the earlier stages do not subsequently become 
barriers to growth. 
But even before the limits of the domestic market for consumers' 
goods are reached, barriers to sustained industrial growth may arise 
in two other forms. The first is a balance of payments constraint. 
It may seem odd to suggest that protectionist policies may lead to 
chronic balance of payments difficulties when that is, in part, what they 
are designed to cure; but the experience of many countries in Latin. Airu. \ca 
and Asia tend to confirm the suggestion. The reason seems to be basically 
that the typical protection system, as described above, represents a very 
costly and inefficient means of balancing the foreign exchange budget. 
Instead of rewarding equally all potential earners and savers of foreign 
exchange, there is one-sided bias in favour.of finishing stages consumers' 
goods industries. And even within this, group there is a relative favouring 
of those that are least efficient and. save the least foreign exchange. 
The import bill, meanwhile, is rising and becoming dominated by the 
"essential" inputs into the import-substitution industries-. Finally, 
exports are positively discouraged by lack of protection plus the under-
valuation of foreign exchange that the system of -protection defends. 
Thus a. rising cost of balancing a growing foreign exchange budget requires 
ever tightening import controls, while the predominance of "essential" 
inputs in the import bill means that this tightening eventually brings a 
shortage of materials, parts and equipment that retards industrial growth. 
The second possibility is one that has appeared in some I atin American 
countries, usually in combination with the first.. It is the inflation 
(and compunded balance of payments difficulties) that arises out of an 
incomes struggle in response to the rising burden that inefficient import 
substitution imposes on the rest of the economy. So inflation and 
balance of payments difficulties may bring industrial stagnation even 
before the first easy phase of import substitution has been completed. 
There are some other consequences of a protection system, biased 
in this pattern, that I will just briefly mention First, growth 
of industrial output and employment will depend heavily on the growth of 
consumption, especially non-essential consumption. Any desire on the 
part of government to,raise saying to accelerate economic growth or to 
redistribute its gains more equitably by taxing non-essential consumption 
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will be frustrated by the need to keep employment and output going, and 
growing, in the favoured industries. Hence there will be strong pressures 
against the kind of tough fiscal policy that is needed both f~f growth 
and social justice. 
At the same time the economy becomes increasingly dependent on the 
rest of the world for its strnply of essentials with the consequence o^ 
increased dependence on the earnings of the primary export sector. 
This sector, in turn, remains dependent on the world market, since the 
protectionist system heavily favours manufacturing based on imported 
inputs over processing of domestic primary products. The counterpart 
is that the manufacturing sector becomes what Hirschman has called an 
"import enclave", linking to the world for its supplies rather than to 
the rest of the economy; and even on the demand side depending, in 
substantial measure, for its sales on the new free-spending urban classes. 
Thus the dualistic character of the economy may be intensified rather than 
ameliorated. And economic alienation, rather than integration, 
characterises regional relations. 
Finally, because of relatively liberal imports of capital equipment, 
the latter is priced artificially low - usually at less than free trade 
pr^ 'ccs because of the undervaluation of foreign exchange. This is 
likely to have an adverse effect on industrial employment not only by 
affecting the factor mix and selection of industries but also by 
discouraging the development of a domestic capital goods industry which 
might produce more labor-using equipment. 
These various possible consequences of a typical protection system -
especially the tendency toward industrial stagnation, chronic balance of 
payments problems and inflation - are now well kiown. As could be 
expected, this has led to a reversal of policy prescriptions for successful 
industrialisation on the part of at least some of the most influential 
erstwhile exponents of protection. The most prominent of these is 
. . . 
Raul Prebisch who', after serving for more-than a decade as the inspiration 
for Latin-American industrialisation, delivered what seemed to be a 
past-mortem on the failures of "inward-looking industrialisation" in his 
first report as Director-General of TJNCTAD in 196k. His solution to 
the problems"of industrialisation in less-developed countries, howerver, 
focussed not on reform of their policies, but on trade preferences 
in the markets of the developed countries. The reason,no doubt, is that 
Prebisch saw clearly that, while the new strategy is outward-looking 
industrialisation, it might be disadvantageous in the context of present 
policies in the wealthy countries for the entire less-developed world' 
simultaneously to reform their policies so as to encourage manufactured 
exports- The consequences in the form of reactive protection in the 
rich countries might be on a scale not yet imagined. 
Nevertheless, for any one small country that decides to become 
aggressively outward-looking in its industrialisation policies, there 
are good reasons for being optimistic of success. One reason, of course, 
is that we can be reasonably certain that most other LDC will not follow 
suit. : Kenya, it seems to me, is in an excellent'position to follow 
successfully this strategy. This is an important assumption in what 
follows, 
THE TRADITIONAL RATIONALE FOR PROTECTION 
It w;as noted above that Hirschman's fourth category of import-
substituting industrialisation is deliberate development policy. 
Hirschman argues that deliberately planned import substitution would not 
be characterised by the same pattern of Perverse distortions found in 
the type described in the previous section. This is no doubt correct 
if planning were perfectly rational. An attempt to outline such a 
rational protection system for industrialisation is set out in the 
following section. •. 
7. Prebisch, Op. cit. 
But it is difficult to locate cases of rwtioftnllv planned 
industrialisation in the real less-developed world. The positive planning 
element is usually hopelessly entangled with the mix of policies surrounding 
foreign exchange use priorities and often serves, in part, as a rationali-
sation for the latter. A rational planning approach would completely 
reverse the priorities that foreign exchange rationing establishes as 
we have seen above. Instead xThat element of deliberate planning for 
industrialisation exists is usually based on a number of traditional 
arguments for protection - such as, for example, the infant industry 
argument. And that these can be made without interfering with the 
biases of balance of payments oriented import substitution is ee.sily 
seen in the circumstance that it is usually consumers' goods production 
for the domestic market that is awarded infant status - less often 
producers' goods, and only rarely production for export. 
It is important, nevertheless, in clearing the way for a discussion 
of a rational protection system, to assess the validity and relevance of 
these"traditional arguments for protection, I will focus on' four: factor 
price disequilibrium, infant industry, the interdependence of investment 
decisions, and terms of trade. 
Factor price disequilibrium, in the form of a wage rate in modern 
manufacturing and related sectors that is much above the social opportunity 
cost of labour, is for many less-developed countries and especially, I 
think, for Kenya one of the most serious obstacles to industrialisation. 
For it means that agriculture and other primary producing sectors can 
export successfully at an exchange rate that prevents manufactures from 
being competitive. Hence the latter cannot be exported and can compete 
in the domestic market only behind substantial protection. What appears 
from market indicators as a comparative advantage in primary production 
and a disadvantage in manufacturing may be, in part, the effect of factor 
price disequilibrium. This becomes particularly important.as a country 
changes from relative natural resource abundance to scarcity ^xs-a-vis 
labour, the implication being that this problem is likely to worsen 
for Kenya in the future. 
Note that it is not the absolute level of wage rates in the modern 
industrial sector that matters, but the duality in the wage structure. 
If wages were uniform for comparable skills over all sectors, the 
exchange rate would have to adjust to attain balance of payments 
equilibrium if the wage level could not. Thus raising wage rates 
everywhere else to the level of the modern industrial sector plus a 
devaluation would be an alternative remedy to a downward adjustment of 
industrial wage rates. Wasow has argued that a devaluation by itself 
would approximate this result. His conclusion depends, however, on the 
key assumptions that real earnings in the traditional sectors would be 
unimpaired by the devaluation, while those in the modern sector would be 
g 
reduced because the money wage would remain fixed. 
Another way to point up the critical importance of the element of 
duality in the wage structure is to postulate a political separation of 
the high and low wage sectors. The former would, then, have to adopt 
an exchange rate (or level of wage rates) at which manufactures could 
be exported (as in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore). • But so long 
as the economy remains dualistic it has other options - unfortunately 
as it turns out. 
The classic remedy for factor price disequilibrium - first argued 
by Manoilescu more than UO years ago - is tariff protection (or other 
N 0 
import restriction)." It has the very great disadvantage, however, 
of correcting the bias against the modern industrial sector only so far 
8. Bernard Wasow, "'A note on Wage and Exchange Rate Policy in an Open 
Underdeveloped Economy", East African Social Sciences Conference, 
Dar Es Salaam, December, 1970. 
9- M. Ms.noilescu.The Theory of Protection, (London: King, 1931). 
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as the domestic market is concerned. The ability to export manufactures 
will, in fact, be further weakened by the undervaluation of foreign 
exchange that tariff protection would defend. Moreover, th' ? would be 
imposed an unnecessary -penalty on the users of the protected products, 
whether producers or consumers. Finally, the remedy of protection does 
nothing to correct the bias in the factor mix that factor price 
disequilibrium implies. 
This last point leads me to the comment that it is never very clear 
whether factor price disequilibrium is a cause of protection or its 
result. Sureljr protection is at least a way of underwriting this 
kind of disequilibrium; and one can easily imagine protection coming 
first, with labour in the modern sector able to capture its share of the 
gains. In any case protection and high industrial wages are likely to 
interact in a way that increases, rather than diminishes, the dependence 
of the economy on traditional primary exports and leads the industrial 
sector into the dead-end of import substitution behind heavy protection. 
To correct the bias against exports in the Manoilescu remedv, Larv 
(and subsequently Kaldor) recommended a dual exchange rate, favourable 
to the modern industrial sector.1^ While this represents an important 
improvement, it is still a second-best remedy, since it leaves the bias 
in the factor mix and the bias against the use of industrial products 
untouched. 
A subsidy to employment, in the modern industrial' sector would 
represent a superior remedy if it could be financed in a relatively 
neutral way. If there cannot be a direct attack on the problem through 
a wages policy, this probably is the best option, since it would correct 
10. H. Lary, "Economic Development and the Capacity to Import-National 
Policies", in Lectures on Economic Develo-pment (Istanbul, 1958). 
N. Kaldor, "Dual Exchange Rates and Economic Development, ''Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, September, 196k. 
all four biases inherent in factor price disequilibrium: the bias-against 
import substitution in manufacturing, the bias against manufactured 
exports, the bias against labour in the factor mix, and the bias against 
the use of industrial products. In contrast, tariff-protection (or 
equivalent import restriction) corrects only the first and worsens the 
other three. Clearly this traditional argument for protection fails. 
I should add, perhaps, that Wasow's suggestion of devaluation as. an 
alternative second-best remedy for,Kenya deserves further study. 
The infant industry argument is well known-and I will not bother 
to detail it here. Instead I will attempt to set down a: few, summary 
points about it and its relation to protection. 
First, it depends essentially on the existence of economies of scale 
and a learning process in production. These are, of-course, found not 
only in manufacturing, but in all-sectors of the economy. Hence, 
there is no justification for restricting infant industry protection to 
the modern industrial sector,nor to import substitutes, nor to consumption 
goods, etc. 
Moreover, it is obvious that the gains from scale economies and, 
perhaps, also from learning by doing will be greater in the context of 
more rapid growth•concentrated in a few lines, rather than in slower growth 
across a broad,front of industries. (Rapid and slow here relate to the 
rates of growth of individual industries, not to the rate of growth of the 
aggregate which might be the same in the two cases.) This means that the 
kinds of.gains inherent in the infant industry situation are likely to 
be realised more fully in the context of an open-economy, specialised 
.industrial development, rather than in the sort of balanced growth 
pattern that emerges behind the usual system of protection.: This is 
11. T. Scitovsky, "Growth ~ Balanced or,Unbalanced?", Papers on Welfare 
and Growth, (Stanford, I96M . ,--...- .V-
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reinforced by the fact;that, since protection.can be only relative, 
dispersing it more broadly simply dilutes it-for each recipient. These -.'• 
considerations, together with the fact that industries can be expected 
to vary in their efficiency response to scale and learning (if indeed this 
could be predicted), suggests that the logic of the infant industry 
argument calls for special encouragement to a relatively few industries 
so as to develop at least some of them as eventual export industries. 
This is clearly not compatible with tariff protection. 
In fact, tariff protection as a remedy for infant- status suffers from, 
two of the same defects mentioned above in connection with-factor price 
disequilibrium: it is biased against the export market and it imposes > 
a penalty on the. use of the product. Yet, surely, if an industry is an 
infant in.the domestic market it is also an infant in the world market. , 
And to realise; the potential gains from scale and learning one. would- want 
to adopt measures--.that;-enhance, not discourage, the use of the product.-
Therefore., :a, subsidy again is a far better remedy than tariff- protection,-
since exports would be encouraged equally with import substitution and 
greater use of the product would, be-encouraged via its lower price. 
Finally, as Stephen -Lewis has reminded, us.,to implement a programme 
of. protection for infant industries one must -have- -not- only an estimate 
of potential cost reduction for the industry, but one must compare this. 
12 
with estimates for all industries at home and abroad. ; For it is long-run 
comparative advantage that is at issue. : It is not enough for' a particular 
industry, -to promise cost reduction.. It must promise relatively greater ' 
cost reduction in relation to-other domestic industries than does its 
counterpart world industry in relation to other world?industries. This may 
sound formidable. It is_ with respect to the difficulty of deciding which 
12. S. Lewis, ?'The Effects.'O? Protection on the Growth Rate of the 
Economy and oh the Need for External .ssistance", Working Paper No. 3^, 
Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, (April 1972), p.l6. 
industries might qualify. It is not, however, in the sense at it 
might be difficult even conceptually to find an industry that would 
qualify. Inevitably some will. That is the meaning of comparative 
advantage. 
Next, there is interdependence of investment decisions. This 
has many facets and I wouldn't try even to begin to deal with all of 
them." It is important, however, to compare interdependence in demand 
and interdependence in supply. The former was important in the balanced 
growth doctrine of some years back - recall the classic shoe factory 
example of Rosenstein-Rodan. This was worked out in the context of a 
closed economy wherein it is indubitably correct that the success of 
an investment depends through demand linkages on all of the other 
investments. What was often passed over, however, was that this necessity 
for investment lo follow the pattern of domestic demand meant foregoing 
advantageous linkages on the supply side - especially where 
economies of scale are important. Opening the economy rescues us from 
this dilemma by permitting us to take full advantage of economies of scale 
and supply linkages while solving the demand problem through international 
trade. It is evident that inward-looking protectionism is not an appropriate 
vehicle for maximising the benefits from the interdependence of investment 
decisions. 
Moreover, as noted above, tariffs or import restrictions have the great 
disadvantage of impeding forward linkages. Consider a simple example. 
Suppose it is decided to provide protection to a new steel industry because 
of its potential economies of scale and many forward linkages. A tariff 
would impose a penalty on steel users, inhibiting the growth of such, 
industries and thereby stunting the growth of the steel industry 
itself. In contrast, a direct subsidy could give the same protection to 
steel without impeding forward linkages. 
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Finally, there is the terms of trade argument for protection. Since 
the marginal terms of trade are not necessarily equal to the average, 
there may he, from the national standpoint, a welfare loss (c_u. a potential 
welfare gain foregone) under free trade. Full Paretoan optimality calls 
for restricting trade until the ratio of domestic prices of exports to 
13 
imports equals the marginal terms of trade. ' This could he done hy 
means of a dual exchange rate, the price of foreign exchange for imports 
exceeding that for exports in the ratio 
c - - v -e-1 
where e is the elasticity of world demand (the world supply elasticity 
assumed to he infinitely great), Alternatively, a uniform tariff (at all 
stages of the production process) equal to C - 1 could produce the same 
result. There are two serious weaknesses in this argument, however, 
even if e could be. estimated.. First, it assumes no retaliation. The 
country, in effect, is allowed to exploit its monopoly position in trade 
unnoticed. Second is the assumption of a single elasticity of demand for 
all exports - presumably a weighted average. • Usually, a country will have 
only one or a few commodities in which it is a relatively important supplier. 
For these the average will be too low. For all of the others the average 
will be too high and will call for a level, of protection (i.e., discrimination 
against exports) that may prove to be a serious handicap to the development 
of minor and new exports. 
This suggests that the few important exports should be treated 
separately with appropriate export taxes (equal to — for the i"^ export) or, • "" 6 -1 
13. T. Scitovsky "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs" (revised), 
Papers on Welfare and Growth (Stanford, 196k). Also S. Alexander, 
"Devaluation versus Import Restriction as an Instrument for Improving 
the Trade Balance," IMF Staff Papers (April, 1951). 
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perhaps, international marketing agreements. For the rest it is often 
assumed that elasticities are infinitely great so that no further measures 
are required. The conclusion would "be, then, that even here there is 
no economic justification for protection. 
It is possible, however, to suggest a limited role for tariff 
protection on terms of trade grounds. In the face of product differentiation 
and concentration in international trade, I think that it is simply not 
reasonable to assume demand elasticities of infinity, even for small 
countries. Elasticities may be high, but not infinitely great. 
Consequently, a case might be made for a low uniform tariff as a correction 
for general terms of trade effects. 
But it seems that this is about all that is left of the traditional 
arguments for protection. I do not want to be misunderstood, however. 
I am not saying that the infant industry,- factor price disequilibrium, 
interdependence of investment decisions,. .and terms of trade arguments 
about the failures of free market prices are wrong. I am saying rather 
that, with one minor exception, tariff protection (or equivalent) is an 
inept and costly remedy for such market failures. 
What are the alternatives? I turn to that question in the next-
section. Surprisingly, perhaps, it turns out that tariffs can play an 
important role in a rational set of industrialisation policies, even 
if tariff protection is, relegated to a minor role. 
h. TOWARD RATIONAL PROTECTION FOR INDUSTRIALISATION 
So far I have been using the word, protection, in a loose sense to 
describe the typical pattern of import restriction that countries employ 
to give domestic producers an advantage over foreign suppliers in the 
domestic market. At this point, however, a more precise notion of 
protection is needed. Accordingly, henceforth when I am referring looselv 
to protection in the above sense I will put the word in quotation marks -
as ''protection". In contrast, protection as an idea will be given a more 
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precise meaning. Moreover, I will consider only tariffs as the ideal 
form of import restriction. The reason will he obvious, I t^ -'nk, when 
we come to the system I attempt to describe below. 
Protection could be defined as all of those measures that improve 
the competitive position of domestic producers vis a. vis their foreign 
rivals. It should be immediately noted that protection, thus defined, 
is not restricted to the domestic market. This is an important departure 
from the older view of protection. Moreover, in addition to tariffs, 
quotas, exchange control, and the like, nrotection ideally would include 
a host of other policies relating to wages and prices, taxes and 
subsidies, administrative rules and procedures, etc. that might favour or 
disfavour' domestic versus foreign suppliers. While it is important to 
consider all of these either in evaluating a system or in prescribing one, 
the presentation here will be considerably simplified by dealing with 
only a limited number of policy instruments: tariffs, a value-added 
sales tax, export taxes, and direct subsidies. 
Before taming to that, however, it might be advantageous to note 
briefly two important aspects of the measurement of protection. First is 
the distinction between "nominal" and "effective"';rates ' of protection. 
Second is the concept of "net effective protection''. 
The nominal rate of protection (t^) for an industry is the proportion 
l U . . 
by which the system of protection permits the net domestic price of its 
output to exceed its free trade value. If a tariff were the only 
instrument of protection, and if the full potential of the protection 
offered were realised, the nominal rate would simply be the ad valorem 
rate of duty. 
lk. "Net" means after taxes and subsidies whose incidence is on the 
producer. 
. In contrastj tlie effective rate of protection (Z^) for an 
industry is the proportion by which value added can exceed free trade 
value added as a result of the nominal rates of protection on both its 
output (t^ and its inputs ("tj)* let J ± represent the output of any 
industry and a----j_ i t s inputs, both valued at world prices. Then cJ ^ 
Y± => 1 ± - - Ox i 
is value added at 7/orld prices, and 
w ± = V.(l + Z±) = Y. (1 + ti) J r aoi ( 1 + V 
is actual value added under the system of protection. Solving for the 
effective rate of protection, 
'""•t. a t W.' - Y 
z . = " 3 = x 
x Y./T. V, 
2/ X X 
Fro^ this we can see that the effective rate of protection 
nf an industry will be greater the greater is its own nominal rate, the 
smaller are the nominal rates of its supplying industries, and the 
smaller is the proporti n of its free trade value added to the free trade 
value of its total product0 Moreover, since Y-/ Y- - 1 - . a-- it 
. . . 0 0 
follows that if t. = t-, then = t. = t.. If all nominal rates are the -J- J J 
same, all effective rates will be equal to the uniform nominal rate. 
When protection is given to one industry there will be 
effects on others and subsequent feedback effeccs on the first industry,. 
Considerable attention lias been given to these general equilibrium 
effects in the theoretical literature, but the results merely indicate 
a range of possibilities, Until we can fill the boxes of general equi-
librium theory with more empirical content w^ will not be able to make..-
much use of i t T h e r e is, however, one aspect of . " general equili-
brium repercussions chat cannot be ignored because of its pervasive 
influence — namely the relation of the exchange rate to the level of 
protection. Moreover, this macro general equilibrium effect can be 
crudely estimated, And, finally, an understanding of this relation-
ship helps us to understand what protection is. 
Consider the following simple example. Suppose that a 
uniform ad valorem tariff rate of T prevails in a situation of balance 
of payments equilibrium* If one has estimates of the various interna-. 
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tional trade elasticities he can further estimate the proportional change 
in the exchange rate that would imply balance of payments equilibrium 
in the absence of protection - i.e., if free trade replaced the tariff. 
This represents an estimate, in other words, of the overvaluation of 
the domestic'currency due to protection. But this overvaluation 
(or undervaluation of foreign exchange) means a dilution of protection 
to that extent. More precisely, let K represent the proportional 
K 
overvaluation of the currency and U = r^ the corresponding undervaluation 
of foreign exchange. Then the rate of net protection (both nominal 
and effective, since nominal rates are uniform at T) is 
n = . ( i + t) ( l - u) - i = i - r r " 1 
The extent to which overvaluation occurs to reduce net protection 
below the tariff depends on the relative importance of the import change, 
as opposed to the export change, in the adjustment of the trade balance. 
With low elasticities of supplj/ and demand for exports, net protection 
can.be very much below the apparent protection offered by the tariff.-
It is ironic, therefore, that policy makers often use an alleged low 
elasticity of demand for their exports as an excuse for a policy of 
"protection". 
When nominal rates are not uniform, effective rates will vary from 
nominal rates and from each other. Net effective protection is defined, 
however, in exactly the same way as 
N = (1 + Z) (1 - U) - 1 
since a variation in the exchange rate will affect all effective rates 
in the same proportion. An important implication of this was noted 
above, in the first section, when it was suggested that machinery may 
be imported at less, than free trade prices owing to the undervaluation 
of foreign, exchange. The implication for exports is also clear. Even 
without penalties from protection of its inputs, an export industry 
will have negative net effective protection just to the extent of the 
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undervaluation of foreign exchange that the system of "protection" 
defends. Finally, the concept of net effective protection helps us 
to understand also why manufacturing (often simply assembling) of 
imported inputs can he favoured over the processing of domestic raw 
products. If the effective rate of protection for imported inputs is 
less than the overvaluation of the currency, these inputs are entering 
at below free trade prices. A natural comparative advantage in the 
processing of domestic agricultural, forestry and mineral products can, 
therefore, be frustrated by "protection".1"* 
There is one more important implication of the relation between the 
level of protection and the exchange rate. Suppose that in the above 
example of uniform nominal rates of T, we add uniform subsidies at 
rate T to all exports. Then (assuming that these uniform rates apply 
to all goods and services) the exchange rate would reach its equilibrium 
value at T proportion above the (estimated) free trade equilibrium level. 
Net protection would be zero for all industries. The situation is 
equivalent to free trade (ignoring the problems of collecting the taxes 
and paying the subsidies). 
The lesson is that protection is necessarily relative. To attempt 
to protect all industries equally means protecting none. 
With this, the way is cleared, I hope, to attempt to outline 
an ideal protection system for industrialisation. It must take into 
account the following requirements, (l) It must correct for the effects 
15. This assumes that the domestic raw products are not internationally 
traded, since otherwise their prices are also reduced by the undervaluation 
of foreign exchange, so that there is no bias from that source. If these 
materials are exported, however, it is likely that the processed good will 
also be exported. Here the bias is the penalty on exports if the comparison 
is made with import substitution manufacturing: and the bias is factor 
price disequilibrium if the comparison is with the export of the 
raw product. Finally, there is no bias if the processing is protected 
enough to correct.factor price.disequilibrium and uses exportable 
domestic materials. 
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of trade on the terms of trade. (2) It must provide for subsidies to 
encourage a selected group of infant industries, as veil to i ard 
external economies. (3) It must provide for subsidies to employment 
in the high vage sector. (U) It must avoid the distortions of the 
price system that occur under the typical regime of "protection", and the 
resulting biases against exports, against backward-linkage import substitution, 
against labour-intensity, and against the processing of indigenous raw 
materials. Moreover, it must, of course, be compatible vith the goals 
and values of society; and must be a manageable system from the standpoint 
of administration. 
Consider first the avoidance of the biases of "protection". This, 
by itself, calls for a uniform effective rate of protection for all 
industries, at all stages of the production process, and for sales in 
world, as well as domestic markets. A uniform tariff matched by a 
uniform subsidy to export at the same ad valorem rate would be a simple 
means of accomplishing this. But aside from the fact that there would 
be effects on the equilibrium exchange rate from "invisible" transactions 
not subject to protection, as well as from capital transactions, this 
would be equivalent to free trade. Net protection everywhere would be 
zero, as was indicated in the example above. Uniform positive net 
protection for everything, in other words, is impossible to achieve, since 
protection is necessarily relative. 
Next consider the correction for terms of trade effects. The 
nature of this has already been indicated in the previous section. The 
few estimated to be relatively low should be taken aside for special 
treatment. If retaliation can be safely ignored each of these should 
be taxed at a rate equal to the reciprocal of its estimated world1 
demand elasticity so as to bring the net private price received by 
exporters into line vith social marginal revenue. This is on the assumption 
that exporters are perfect competitors;,... If, on the other h 1, they 
are aware of their degree of monopoly in the world and restrict exports 
optimally, the tax has another rationale: to capture for society 
the private monopoly gain. (Note that this tax is an offset against the 
common subsidy accorded to all exports,. these included). 
If retaliation cannot be ignored, the case is more complicated. 
The classic argument is that the existence of the threat of retaliation 
should lead to an international marketing agreement."^ Whether or not 
this is actually in the interest of a particular country depends, of 
course, on the terms of the. agreement and on an estimate of the economic 
consequences of "going it alone". No more can be said about that here. 
The. importance of treating some major exports in this manner cannot 
world for 
be overstated. A common excuse around the less-developed/maintaining 
an overvalued currency is the low world elasticity of demand for those 
exports that are the principal earners of foreign exchange. Whether 
or not this concern is entirely real or partly due to elasticity pessimism 
the effect nonetheless is to maintain an exchange rate at which all of 
the other exports (existing and potential) are. severely and unnecessarily 
discouraged. Ironically many of these same .countries pay. lip service 
to the need for diversifying exports. Econom: sts. who lean too heavily 
on elasticity pessimism as an explanation of this phenomenon, however, 
may be performing a disservice for these countries. , It might be better 
to recognise, their fears as operative, even if not fully validated, 
and urge special.treatment of the. kind indicated above, in the 
paramount interest of freeing all other exports from this discrimination. 
Moving on to more general terms of trade considerations, it seems 
to me that economists are often elasticity optimists, with, respect to 
minor exports from relatively small countries. The common assumption 
16. S c i t o v s k y , op. c i t . 
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of elasticit ies of infinity, while convenient, is not likely to be 
strictly true. Let me suggest only considerations of product differenti-
ation, consumers' preferences, and trade concentration as reasons for 
doubt that infinitely great elasticities can realistically be assumed. 
It is surprising, I think, that economists typically judge these 
elasticities in relation to the "world market1"' in the face of a wealth 
of evidence on trade concentration. 
In any case, however, we can expect these elasticities to be very 
high, so that a correction for these more general potential terms of 
trade effects would be quite modest. If the average demand elasticity 
for these minor exports were about minus twenty, and the dispersion 
of values around this average not very great, the appropriate modification 
of the uniform effective rate system would be to raise all tariffs 
to a level five percentage points above the common export subsidy. This 
might be as far as anyone would want to go in discriminating against 
exports in general. 
This last judgement is reinforced, I think, by a consideration of the 
risks of exporting. In general, these risks are plainly visible to the 
private entrepreneur. In fact, he will feel them more strongly than 
the government who can consider the risks pooled for all exports rather 
than the sum of all the private risks. In other words, the total 
social risk is less than the total private risk. Consequently, 
exporting will, for this reason, tend to fall short of the socially 
optimal level. This is especially true if, as could be expected, the 
removal of penalties on new exports resulted in greater export diversification. 
Next is the problem of providing for subsidies in infant industry 
and external economies cases, as well as to employment in the high 
wage sector. The greatest problem with respect to the first two 
is identification and measurement of the potential. I have nothing 
to say here about that, but instead will simply consider the problem of 
finance. This is where a value added tax comes into the picture. 
(An ordinary sales or excise tax on finished goods would be a second-
best substitute). 
The key to an efficient, relatively neutral means of financing 
these subsidies and providing the required level of terms of trade 
protection, while simultaneously avoiding the biases of "protection", 
lies in the way by which a uniform domestic value added tax (VAT) and a 
17 
uniform tariff combine to influence net effective rates of protection. 
(I could from here on simply call the tariff a VAT on imports and state 
everything in terms of a '"'destination principle" VAT; but since the 
level will be different for imports, I prefer to continue to call it a 
tariff). 
Consider first the case where the uniform tariff is at the same 
level as the uniform VAT. Each sale in the domestic market is subject 
to the VAT or tariff, but each seller is entitled, to a credit for the 
VAT and tariffs paid by his suppliers. Exports are not subject to the 
VAT, but receive the same credits for taxes paid at the previous stage. 
Taxes, therefore, will presumably rest purely on value added and the 
latter will be reduced for all activities, except exports, in the 
proportion of the VAT. On the other hand, values added.will be raised 
in the same proportion for all of these activities by the uniform tariff, 
so that the net effect is nil. Exports, on the other hand, have neither 
the benefit of the tariff, nor the penalty of the VAT: again a nil 
effect on value added. Net effective rates of protection will be zero 
for all, lust as in the case of free trade. 
Compare this with the situation (described above) where uniform 
tariffs plus equal subsidies to exports also was shown to be equivalent 
17- Ronald McKinnon has urged such a system for Singapore. See his 
"Export Expansion through Tax Policy: the case for a ir&la® -Added 
Tax in Singapore1', Malayan Economic Review, 1966. 
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to free trade. The counterpart in the VAT-tariff system to the export 
subsidy is simply the exemption of exports from the VAT, 
Now to get the required terms of trade protection, we need only 
to raise the common tariff by five percentage points above the VAT. 
This will give net effective rates of protection for all import substitutes 
at a level five percentage points above that for all exports (other than 
major exports). Since the equilibrium exchange rate will change somewhat, 
this may mean, for example, three per cent net effective rates for import 
substitutes and minus two per cent for exports. 
I cannot refrain from commenting on a confusion that seems to be 
wideispread in discussions of the impact of such.a VAT system on exports. 
Most often it is held that exemption from VAT is a great encouragement 
to exports. It is, if compared to the biases against exports in a 
"protection" system. It is not, if compared to free trade. In fact, 
it just removes - no more - the bias against exports that is inherent 
in "protection", 
But real protection to counter the market failures that hinder 
industrialisation will come from subsidies - to values added in the cases 
of infant industry and external economies, and to employment.in the .case, 
of factor price disequilibrium.. To finance these with a minimum of . . 
distortion requires only raising the absolute level of the tari^f-VAT 
combination high enough to generate the required revenue, while keeping 
the differential of five percentage points intact. Thus tariffs (and VAT) 
can be raised for revenue purposes without distorting "protection" effects. 
And net effective rates of protection for various industries will depend 
mainly on the subsidies provided to correct legitimate cases of market 
failure,'without bias against exports, employment, backward integration 
and forward-linkage, processing of domestic ra,v products. The result 
should be a far more efficient and rapid growth of the industrial sector 
that can be sustained without the usual balance of -payments and market 
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constraints that plague industrialisation efforts in less developed, 
countries. 
Moreover., the system could largely replace the hodge-podge of 
policies that have mushroomed in less-developed countries under the 
guise of incentives to industrialisation. It would he far simpler 
to manage than the present system in Kenya (or anywhere) - uniform 
tariffs and VAT almost defying evasion. And, finally, to meet income 
distribution goals, VAT rates (and tariffs) could he raised on luxury 
goods and services, and reduced or eliminated on essential items that 
loom large in the budgets of the poor. 
I scarcely need to add that the transition to such a system 
should, of course, be gradual. High tariff rates should come down 
(hopefully in the context of bargaining for reciprocal reductions from 
other countries) and low rates should go up according to a schedule 
made known in advance, so that the target of tariff uniformity is 
reached in a de.cade or two. In the meantime excise taxes can be introduced 
more.widely along with subsidies to employment in the high wage sector, 
to value added in infant industriesand to exports. In this way the 
important corrections can be made with a minimum of disruption. 
I will conclude with a very brief note on the relevance of all 
of this to development problems and policies in Kenya. First there is 
the question of the actual structure of protection in Kenyan industry. 
Phelps and Wasow have produced a comprehensive picture for large-scale 
i8 
manufacturing. I will not even begin to attempt to report on their 
findings. Perhaps the following will suffice for the purpose here. 
Effective rates of protection range from strongly negative to astronomically 
high without much hint of rhyme or reason. Ignoring extreme values 
18. M. Phelps and B. Wasow, "Measuring Protection and Its Effects in Kenya", 
Working Paper No. 37, Institute for Development Studies, University of 
Nairobi, (April, 1972). 
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(including six industries which appear to have negative value added in 
world prices), we find exports and capital goods with negative rates. 
Import substitutes range from about IS per cent to almost 2,000 per cent, 
with more than one-third of them above 100 per cent. Phelps and Wasow 
do not compare average rates for consumption goods and intermediate 
goods, but earlier Wasow and King had reported averages of 69 per cent 
. 1 9 
and 20 per cent respectively. ' It seems, therefore, that Kenya already 
has the kind of distorted protection system described above in the second 
section. 
How does this picture of protection match the picture of Kenya's 
industrialisation goals and aspirations (as revealed in the current 
20 
plan)? First, there is a. recognition in the Plan that the rate Of 
industrial growth has been inadequate. Second, there is a recognition 
that there has been too much emphasis on assembling imported semi-manufactures 
and not enough on processing Kenya's raw materials. Third, there is a 
recognition that import substitution opportunities must increasingly 
be in the earlier, more basic, stages of manufacturing. Fourth, there 
is some ambivalence about manufactured'exports. A"conservative" growth 
projection of 5-5 per cent per annum is set, while at the same time it 
is suggested that a 10 per cent growth could be achieved. A tendency 
for costs and prices to rise faster than those of its competitors is 
noted as a constraint. Fifth, the importance of both supply linkages 
and regional balance is emphasised. Finally, there is a recognition 
tha.t to achieve its growth targets Kenya must trade more, not less, 
with the world. 
19. B. Wasow and J.R. King, "Industrial Development in Kenya: a case 
of Latin Americanization?"' (Unpublished). 
20. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan for the Period 1970 to 197 k, 
pp. iv and 30U-313. 
Success in each of these aspects of industrial growth will depend 
to a considerable degree on the kind of protection system Kenya has 
adopted. For example, the rate of manufacturing growth would quickly 
tail off if concentration remained on import-substituting consumption 
goods. The future rapid growth areas will be backward integration and 
exports. This seems to be recognised. What is missing, however, 
is any indication of recognition that the existing protection system is 
strongly biased against this switch in emphasis. 
Again, processing of domestic raw materials is closely related to 
exports and also to regional balance (with implications for employment 
and income distribution). And yet I wonder if the extent of the 
penalties on manufactured exports imposed by the protection system is 
recognised along with the other biases against such processing of Kenyan 
materials that were noted above. 
I wonder also if it is fully recognised how the costs and prices 
(let's add wages) in Kenyan manufacturing that limit its international 
competitiveness are related to the kind of protection system Kenya has 
(perhaps inadvertently) adopted. How much of the pessimism about 
manufactured exports would disappear if they were subsidised aI the same 
rate as sales in the domestic market? 
Again I wondei if it is fully recongnised how protection via tariff 
or import restriction impedes the linking of investment decisions, as well 
as the promotion of growth in infant industries, by penalising the use 
of the protected product. 
In short, I wonder if Kenya's policy makers realise that their 
policies are antagonistic to their goals. 
JP/vls 
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